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COMMENTS
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL
'CONSEQUENCES IN WISCONSIN OF REMARRIAGE
AFTER DIVORCE
Development in interpretation since the comment, "Marriage With-
in the Statutory Prohibited Period After Divorce", appeared in the
Marquette Law Review' has been sufficient to justify a recapitulation of
the subject and restatement of some of the conclusions arrived at
therein.
The problem, as the title of the comment implies, concerns the
validity of a remarriage after an absolute divorce decree but within
the time period in which a statute has forbidden a remarriage. In any
discussion of the subject, of basic importance is the legal effect of the
individual decree of divorce. Does it dissolve the marriage bonds im-
mediately, or not until the statutory prescribed time period has expired?
In the first instance the parties upon issuance of the decree are re-
stored to a single status; in the second they are not. Even with all
the hexogenious statutes pertaining to the subject and great diversity
in interpretation thereof that abounds in the United States because of
the lack of uniformity between states in the treatment of divorce,
2
it is a safe generalization to say that if the parties are not rendered
single by the decree, a remarriage would be bigamous and not recog-
nized in any state. Such general statement has the peculiar value of
most general statements; so now to examine some of the qualifications
and ramilications that appear when different factual instances arise.
All discussion will proceed on the assumption that the validity of the
marriage subsequent to the divorce has been contested in the Wiscon-
sin Court.
I. DIvoRcE IN WIscoNsIN - REmARRIAGE IN WISCONSIN.
With the directness in which the statutory language is couched and
the Court's interpretation3 being as univocal as it is, this first topic can
be summarily dismissed. Section 245.03(2), Wisconsin Statutes, pro-
vides:
"It shall not be lawful for any person who is a party to an
action for divorce from the bonds of matrimony, in any court
in this state, to marry again until one year after judgment of
divorce is granted, and the marriage of any such person solemn-
ized before the expiration of one year from the date of the grant-
ing of judgment of divorce shall be null and void."
130 Marq. Law Review 108 (1946), Norris Nordahl.
2 35 Am. Jur., Marriage 56-83; 32 A.L.R. 1088.
3 Dallman v. Dallman, 159 Wis. 480, 149 N.W. 137 (1915); White v. White,
167 Wis. 615, 168 N.W. 704 (1918).
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In Dallman v. Dallman4 the plaintiff sought an annulment to his
marriage with defendant which had been celebrated in Wisconsin be-
fore defendant's one year waiting period after her Wisconsin divorce
decree had elapsed. In holding for the plaintiff it was said that such
subsequent marriage was void ab initio. The statutory language is
explicit enough to make it unnecessary at this point to consider whether
the Wisconsin decree provided for a divorce immediately on the date
of its being granted or merely provided for one after the one year wait-
ing period. The result would seem to be the same in either event.
The above stated result is inescapable unless the facts in any partic-
ular case come within section 245.35, Wisconsin Statutes.5 In that
event the Wisconsin Court has held that the subsequent marriage be-
comes valid.6 This statute will only control if the action is brought
after the expiration of the one year statutory waiting period; the sub-
sequent marriage was a ceremonial one; one party was in good faith
on entering such marriage; and there has been a living together in
good faith on the part of one of them until the one year has passed.'
II. DIVORCE IN WISCONSIN - REMARRIAGE OUTSIDE WISCONSIN.
This topic can be divided into two parts for present consideration;
first, where a return to a Wisconsin domicile after the subsequent mar-
riage appears, and second, where a new domicile is established outside
Wisconsin after the subsequent marriage. As to the first, the result
reached has in all respects been the same as that indicated under topic
I." A typical statement in such a situation is the following language
from the leading case of Lanham v. Lanham.9
"To say that the legislature intended such a law (245.03)
to apply only while the parties are within the boundaries of the
state and that it contemplated that by crossing the state line its
citizens could successfully nullify its terms; is to make the act
essentially useless and impotent and ascribe practical imbecility
to the lawmaking power .... It (245.03) seems unquestionably
4 159 Wis. 480, 149 N.W. 137 (1915).
5 Wis. Stat. 245.35: "If a person during the lifetime of a husband or wife with
whom the marriage is in force, enters into a subsequent marriage contract
.... and the parties thereto live together thereafter as husband and wife,
and such subsequent marriage contracts was entered into by one of the
parties in good faith, in the full belief that the former husband or wife was
dead, or that the former marriage had been annuled, or dissolved by a di-
vorce, or without knowledge of such former marriage, they shall, after
the impediment to their marriage has been removed by the death or divorce
of the other party to such former marriage, if they continue to live together
as hubsand and wife in good faith on the part of one of them, be held to
have been legally married from and after the removal of such impedi-
ment. .. ."
6 Hoffman v. Hoffman, 242 Wis. 83, 7 N.W.(2d) 428 (1943).
7 Ibid.8 Lanham v. Lanham, 136 Wis. 360, 117 N.W. 787 (1908).
9 lbid at page 367.
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intended to control the conduct of the residents of the state
whether they be within or outside of its boundaries."
If that language could be said to leave any room for doubt, a later
enacted Wisconsin statute, section 245.04(1), certainly concludes any
speculation on the point. 0
As to the second subdivision under this topic; when the parties take
up domicile outside of Wisconsin after the subsequent marriage, fur-
ther matter must be ±aken into account. Here the result of invalidity
is reached with only slightly less facility. A distinction must be drawn
between the type of divorce decree granted, i.e. whether in praesenti
or not. Although discussion of the former type of decree would ap-
pear unnecessary in view of the clear language of 247.37" and a recent
decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,' 2 it is still important be-
cause uncertainty on the point persists.
If the Wisconsin divorce could be in praesenti, the marital status
would be considered dissolved at the time of the decree. The problem
presented is whether the statutory prohibition against marriage within
one year would be accorded extraterritorial effect. A negative answer
is indicated. Subsequent marriage under such circumstances, if valid
under the laws of the lex loci celebrationis, most assuredly would be
valid in Wisconsin.' 3
Where the Wisconsin decree does not dissolve the marriage bonds
immediately at the date of the decree, which now seems clear, the
remarriage outside the state, regardless of bona fide domicile being also
taken up outside the state, will not be held valid by the Wisconsin
Court for the simple reason that the parties to the divorce are still
10 Wis. Stat., identical with section one of the Uniforn Marriage Evasion Act
adopted in 1915. "If any person residing and ihtending to continue to reside
in this state who is disabled or prohibited from contracting marriage under
the laws of this state shall go into another state or country and there con-
tract a marriage prohibited and declared void by laws of this state, such
marriage shall be null and void for all purposes in this state with the same
effect as though such prohibited marriage had been entered into in this state."
f Wis. Stat., "(1) When a judgment or decree of divorce from the bonds of
matrimony is granted so far as it affects the status of the parties it shall not
be effective until the expiration of one year from the date of the granting of
such judgment or decree."
12 State v. Grengs, 253 Wis. 248 at 253, 33 N.W. (2d) 248 (1948) where it is
said, "This court has consistently held that until the expiration of the year
from the granting the judgment of divorce, there is no absolute severance of
the marital relationship. Heller v. Johnson, 162 Wis. 19, 154 N.W. 845;
White v. White, 167 Wis. 615, 168 N.W. 704; Ex parte Soucek (7th Cir.)
101 Fed(2d) 405, 406."
"Under such provisions in sec. 247.37, subs. (1), (3) and (4) .... if an
attempted remarriage takes place before the specified time has elapsed, neither
of the parties to the action of divorce ceases to be married to the other until
the lapse of that time."
13 Frame v. Thorman, 102 Wis. 653, 79 N.W. 39 (1899) ; Van Storch v. Griffin,
71 Pa. 240 (1872); Powell v. Powell, 207 Ill. App. 292 (1917), affirmed in
282 Ill. 357, 118 N.E. 786 (1918); Fordham v. Marrero, 273 Fed. 61 (1921).
24 See supra, notes 11 and 12.
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considered married. A recent decision, that of State v. Grengs,15 clears
up any doubts that might exist on the point. There, after a Wisconsin
divorce and within the prohibited time, one of the parties married a
third person in Iowa and, although they returned to Wisconsin dom-
icile, the Court held, stating extra-issue but with finality, that no valid
marriage anywhere was possible within the one year waiting period
because of the character and necessary effect of a Wisconsin divorce.
The Court quoted with approval from American Jurisprudence, as
follows :16
"If, however, the effect of the provision of the statute or
the decree of divorce is to postpone the dissolution of the former
marriage until the lapse of the prescribed period, it is clear that
a remarriage within that period will not be recognized or given
effect in the state where the decree was granted, or, for that
matter, in any other state, ex hypothesi, one of the parties at
the time of the remarriage had not the status of an unmarried
person. A provision of the statute or decree, thus postponing
the dissolution of the former marriage, is part of the decree
and within full faith and credit provision of the Federal Con-
stitution . The real question in this connection is whether the
provision of the statute or decree in question does postpone the
dissolution of the former marital relation. If it does so postpone
the dissolution of the former marital relation, it generally binds
both parties to the divorce in such respect, so that a marriage
by either of them in another state within the prohibited period
will not be recognized."
The case of State v. Grengs resolves all doubts as to the validity
of a foreign marriage within the one year waiting period even though
the parties intend to and do take up bona fide domicile outside the state.
No marriage within the year after a Wisconsin divorce will be held
valid by the Wisconsin Court, unless section 245.3517 can be shown
to be effective. In that event the void marriage is validated and is so
15 See supra, note 12; generally other states hold as Wisconsin does regarding
the ability of parties to a Wisconsin divorce to remarry within the one year
period subsequent to the divorce. See Means v. Means, 40 Cal. App. (2d) 469,
104 P(2d) 1066 (1940), where plaintiff obtained a Wisconsin divorce, then
moved to California and was remarried in Arizona before the expiration of
the required one year waiting period. The remarriage was held void. Also
Cummings v. United States, 34 F(2d) 284 (1929) where a Wisconsin di-
vorced woman married a soldier in Minnesota and remained a Wisconsin
resident. The marriage was held void because the ceremony was within the
prohibited one year. In Mosholder v. Industrial Commission, 329 Ill. 497,
160 N.E. (1928) an attempted remarriage in Illinois within the year after a
Wisconsin divorce was held void. Contra, but where the matter of full faith
and credit was not mentioned. In re Ommang's Estate, 183 Minn. 92, 235 N.W.
529 (1931), where remarriage in Minnesota within the one year after a Wis-
consin divorce was held valid. The court looked at the parties as Minnesota
residents over which no other state could exercise control.
1635 Am. Jur., Marriage pp. 297, 298; sec. 184; citation quoted from the case.
17 See supra, note 5.
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whether the challenged marriage was celebrated in Wisconsin or out-
side of Wisconsin.' s
III. DIVORCE OUTSIDE WISCONSIN - REMARRIAGE IN WISCONSIN.
This topic again can be subdivided; first, where the parties to the
subsequent marriage intend to reside in Wisconsin or in a state other
than that granting the divorce, and second, where the parties to the
subsequent marriage intend to return to the state where the divorce
was granted. This breakdown refers only to divorces in praesenti.
After what has been said, it is obvious that if the divorce by a state
outside Wisconsin were such as not to take effect until the end of the
prohibited period, no remarriage in Wisconsin or elsewhere could be
validily undertaken within such period.1 9
In cases under the first subheading remarriage seems valid, no other
difficulty appearing. The prohibition imposed by the state of divorce
is regarded as having no extraterritorial effect. The only matter that
would seem to prevent validity would be an inclination on the part of
the court to recognize through comity the other state's prohibition; and
such inclination appears difficult, if not impossible, to make out.
20
No question of full faith and credit enters here unless the prohibition
is made part of the divorce decree. The reason is that full faith and
credit applies to the judgments or decrees of a court and not to statutes
which have no extraterritorial effect.
As to the second subheading; by returning to the state where the
divorce was granted, the parties may invoke the second section of the
Marriage Evasion Act.21
IV. DIVORCE OUTSIDE WISCONSIN - REMARRIAGE IN SECOND STATE.
Again under this topic divorces are classified into those operative
upon the granting of the decree, and those not effective until the lapse
of the statutory time period. If marriage was contracted in a second
state after the latter kind of divorce, full faith and credit would neces-
sitate a holding of void by a Wisconsin court unless again section
245.35, Wisconsin Statutes, could be shown to control. If 245.35 in
such case was held controlling and the remarriage held valid in Wis-
consin, several questions as to the extraterritorial effect of such Wis-
Is Hoffman v. Hoffman, 242 Wis. 83, 7 N.W. (2d) 428 (1943).
19 See supra, note 16.20 Frame v. Thorman, 102 Wis. 653 at 672, 79 N.W. 39 (1899). "The statutes of
another state, prohibiting a person who has been divorced for adultery from
remarrying have no extra-territorial force, and cannot prevent him from law-
fully marrying in this state; although it may subject him to punishment in
the former state."
21 Wis. Stat. sec. 245.04. "No marriage shall be contracted in this state by a
party residing and intending to continue to reside in another state or juris-
diction, if such marriage would be void if contracted in such other state orjurisdiction and every marriage celebrated in this state in violation of this
provision shall be null and void."
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consin decision might be raised. From the wording of the statute and
the interpretation given it in Hoffman v. Hoffman,22 it appears cer-
tain that the statute applies to the type of situation now discussed.
Where the divorce is in presenti, any holding will depend on
whether the parties after their subsequent marriage returned to the
state of the divorce or not. With this distinction in mind it becomes
clear that Hall v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin 3 and Owen v.
Owen,24 both involving in praesenti divorces under the same Illinois
statute, are not in conflict as is often stated to be the case, but both
are the law of this state under their respective fact situations.
Under the first situation, where the parties to the subsequent mar-
riage again take up domicile in the forum that granted the in praesenti
divorce, and still assuming a prescribed waiting period before remar-
riage, the laws of that forum must be examined. If it can be shown
that remarriage would be declared void if celebrated there and that
the Marriage Evasion Act or a statute similar to the first section of
that act exists, the Wisconsin Court will hold that the subsequent
marriage is invalid.
".... This court has also held that where parties are pro-
hibited from marrying in the state of their domicile and they
leave such state for the purposes of evading the laws of the
state of their domicile, are married in a sister state, return to
the state of their domicile, and live there, in illicit cohabitation,
it will give effect to the laws of such state where the parties
thereafter remove to this state."' '2 5
1f the divorcing forum had neither Marriage Evasion Act nor
similar statute, however, it would seem that the urgency for such
comity would be lacking because in holding with the divorcing forum
that the subsequent marriage was invalid, the Wisconsin Court has
stressed the existence of such statute and appeared to base its holding
thereon.2
6
In doing this the Wisconsin Court viewed the matter through the
eyes of the divorcing forum. Invalidity could also be ascertained from
the viewpoint of the remarriage forum if it could be spelled out that
such remarriage was not valid there. This could be accomplished, as-
suming: (1) that the parties returned to domicile in the state which
22 See supra, note 18.
23165 Wis. 364, 162 N.W. 313 (1917).
24 178 Wis. 609, 190 N.W. 364 (1922).
25 Ibid at page 613. Also supporting this view is the language of the Court in
the Hall case, where it is said, ."Since (the Illinois statute) declares a public
policy similar to our own, no good reason is perceived why this court should
not take cognizance of plaintiff's evasion of the laws of our sister state and
apply the same rule to their infraction that we would apply to a violation of
our own laws."
26 Hall v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 165 Wis. 364, 162 N.W. 313(1917).
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granted the divorce and, (2) that the parties were prohibited from
remarrying in that state; if the lex loci celebrationis had adopted sec-
tion two of the Marriage Evasion Act or similar statute.27 The statute
clearly voids a marriage under these facts. Would not the same
grounds for comity be present?
Under the second situation, where the parties go elsewhere than
the state of divorce, the Wisconsin Court has followed the general
rule of cases where a marriage's validity is in question and held that
such marriage if valid where contracted, is valid everywhere.23 The
divorcing forum's proscription against remarriage is regarded as not
extraterritorial and not effective to reach over its border to disturb the
subsequent marriage ceremony. An even clearer case is presented, if
before the divorce is decreed, the party to the subsequent marriage has
taken up domicile in some other state. That comity is not available
in such circumstances appears from the language used in Fitzgerald v.
Fitzgerald.29
"If it had been the intention of the legislature in the modi-
fication of the existing rules of law relating to the validity of
marriages in other jurisdictions, to extend the public policy of
the state to the point of declaring void marriages contracted in
violation of the law of other states, it would have undoubtedly
said so."
Looking at the controversial cases of Hall v. Industrial Commission
of Wisconsin, and Owen v. Owen plus the cases that follow it, keeping
in mind the foregoing discussion, one can easily distinguish 0° In the
Hall case there was a divorce in Illinois, remarriage within the for-
bidden period in Indiana, two months in Wisconsin, then return to
Illinois for one and a half years. The remarriage was held void.31 In
27 See supra, note 21.
28 35 Am. Jur., Marriage 56-83; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 210 Wis. 543, 246 N.W.
680 (1933).29210 Wis. 543, 246 N.W. 680 (1933).
30 Ibid. "It is considered that Owen v. Owen (1922) is not out of harmony with
the prior, decisions of this court." The Hall decision was handed down in
1917.
31 The return to Illinois seemed to be the deciding factor in this case; but also
necessary for the Wisconsin holding was; first, an Illinois statute that de-
clared remarriages within the prohibited period void, and second, the Uni-
form Marriage Evasion Act, section one (in effect in Illinois). Illinois adopted
the Marriage Evasion Act in 1915. (Smith-Hurd Ill. St., c.89, para. 19-20)
which took care of the second point; the first requirement was fulfilled by
Illinois Statute, chapter 40, sec. la Smith-Hurd Ill. Ann. Stats. which pro-
vided: "That in every case in which a divorce has been granted .... neither
party shall marry again within one year from the time the decree -was
granted . . .provided however, that nothing in this section shall prevent the
persons divorced from remarrying each other, and every person marrying
contrary to the provisions of this section shall be punished by imprisonment
in the penitentiary .... and said marriage shall be held absolutely void."
An additional point that might deserve some attention is the Court's men-
tion that the statute was "deemed imported into plaintiff's divorce decree.'
1948]
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the Owens case there was a divorce in Illinois, remarriage in Michigan,
and subsequent domicile in Wisconsin. The remarriage was held valid.
Also in Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald32 there was a divorce in Illinois after
the party to the subsequent marriage in Indiana had taken up domicile
in Wisconsin, and the parties to the remarriage later domiciled in Wis-
consin. The remarriage was held valid.
If the facts of the Hall case should be presented again, it is doubt-
ful that the same decision would be reached in view of the fact that
the Illinois statutes under which the Illinois judgment rendering such
a marriage invalid has been changed.3
CONCLUSION
Where parties marry after the divorce of one of them from a third
person, the time of required celibacy not having been observed, the
Wisconsin Court will say such marriage is valid only under the follow-
ing circumstance: An in praesenti divorce of another state when the
parties remarry in yet another state with intent (carried out) not to re-
turn to domicile in the state granting the divorce. In all cases the as-
sumption is that the marriage is in accord with the requirements of the
state where the ceremony was performed.
HOWARD H. BOYLE, JR.
If the decision was based on that consideration, which seems not according
to the distinction drawn in Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, full faith and credit
would have possibly called for holding the subsequent marriage invalid,
whether or not the parties returned to Illinois. This point appears to have
been regarded as of little importance, but yet it might be one not to be lost
sight of.
32 See supra, note 29.
33 Act approved June 30, 1923; (Laws 1923 p. 327). The repealing act validates
all marriages contracted in violation of section la if otherwise legal and
vested property rights are not affected.
"It is apparent that if the parties to this action had taken up their residence
in the State of Illinois at or after the passage of the repealing and validating
act of 1923, the marriage would have been valid in Illinois." Fitzgerald v. Fitz-
gerald, 210 Wis. 543, 246 N.W. 680 (1933).
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